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This article attempts to analyse the European Union’s (EU) financial and 
technical support to cultural actors in EU Neighbourhood countries. In particular, it 
enquires whether the boundaries of what cultural sector means for the EU are based 
on a Eurocentric understanding of civil society or rather on a more inclusive definition 
mediated with partner countries’ societies. The work hypothesises that the EU tends to 
support cultural civil society organisations on the basis of their closeness to European 
standards, norms and values. Findings highlight a mixed picture. On the one hand, 
a Eurocentric understanding of civil society tends to prevail in EU discourses and is 
enforced by technical means addressing the status and capacity of the organisations 
involved, with some exceptions. On the other hand, the EU does not seem to impose 
strong prerequisites concerning the agenda of organisations and aims to be as 
inclusive as possible.
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Introduction 
In many neighbourhood countries ethnic, religious 
and cultural identities and traditions play a crucial 
role as regards the way society functions. During 
the public consultation, stakeholders referred to 
these factors and asked the EU to allow more 
co-ownership. The EU should therefore expand 
outreach to relevant members of civil society in 
its broadest sense as well as social partners (EC 
& HR, 2015: 7).
This reflection included in the 2015 Joint 
Communication on the review of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) represents a rare and 
ambiguous reference to an issue that does not lie at 
the heart of policy debates in Brussels. This can be 
summarised by three questions. What constitutes ‘civil 
society’ (CS) in countries that do not share many of the 
fundamental political, social and cultural features of 
liberal Western societies? Does the European Union 
(EU) engage with societal actors that do not resemble its 
own idea of CS as either independent from political and 
religious ties or showing a clear liberal and democratic 
agenda? If not, does the EU have an interest in engaging 
with such actors? While an encompassing reflection 
on all these aspects is beyond the reach of this work, 
the following analysis seeks to provide a case study 
with a thematic focus. It looks at EU cultural relations 
with Neighbourhood countries and in particular at EU’s 
financial and technical support to their cultural actors. 
Cultural relations have been an integral part of the ENP 
since its beginning, and the EU has developed a sound 
experience in supporting the cultural sector in the 
region. However, this study seeks to enquire whether 
the boundaries of what cultural sector means for the 
EU are mostly based on a Eurocentric understanding 
of CS or rather on a more inclusive definition mediated 
with the nature of societies in partner countries.
The concept of civil society is a contested one, 
subject to multiple definitions and often politicised. It is 
widely understood as a space between the individual 
and the state, where association and civic action take 
place to represent societal needs. As observed by 
Yom (2005) different scholars and actors stretch the 
definition of what is civil society and who is part of it 
based on their normative views. For example, seen with 
a western blueprint of CS in mind, the Arab world has 
in recent decades failed to develop a large number 
of secular associations successfully advocating for 
political and societal change. The public space of civic 
activism, solidarity and political transformation has 
been more often occupied by Islamist associations, 
which have remained largely outside of the Western 
donors support to CS (ibid.: 20). Structural differences 
in the expressions of activism in the public sphere also 
exist between Western Europe and the post-Soviet 
space, where totalitarian rule and repression have 
affected the development of CS and participation in 
its organisational life (Bernhard & Karakoç, 2007). The 
purpose of this research is not primarily to analyse these 
differences, but to inquire if a Eurocentric definition of 
the boundaries of CS informs policies in support of the 
cultural sector. The work starts from a hypothesis that 
the EU tends to approach and support Civil Society 
Organisations (CSOs) in the field of culture on the basis 
of their closeness to European standards, norms and 
values. If we consider foreign policy as a process that 
traces boundaries (Campbell, 1998: 73), it becomes 
clear that this practice of selection and exclusion is 
not neutral, as it concerns the definition of a European 
identity in relation with (and potentially in opposition to) 
Others. 
Methodology 
 
In order to justify the hypothesis, the analysis starts 
by reviewing the broader academic debates over 
the role of international donors in supporting CS in 
developing countries. The major criticality arising from 
this review is the following: Western donors tend to 
adopt an exclusionary approach to CS in developing 
countries and target actors on the ground of their 
status (privileging formal/registered organisations), 
agenda (privileging organisations sharing liberal norms 
and values), and capacity (privileging organisations 
with pre-existing experience in aid techniques and 
vocabulary). Taken together, these factors can create 
or further exacerbate societal cleavages and lead 
to the creation of an artificial CS which, while suiting 
some Western donors’ needs and ambitions, is not 
endogenous and legitimised.
After this framing, the hypothesis is tested against 
three types of empirical evidence. First, document 
analysis of the declaratory level of EU policies to enquire 
how the EU perceives and defines the boundaries of 
CS in ENP countries. Second, an analysis of some of 
the instruments designed by the EU to support the 
cultural sector in the Neighbourhood to see whether 
these concerns are reflected in practice. This will focus 
on recent multi-country and regional programmes: 
cross-border cooperation (CBC) programmes for the 
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period 2014-2018 in the East and ‘Media and culture for 
development in the Southern Mediterranean region’ 
(hereafter MaC) (2013-2017) in the South. Finally, a 
further case study will look at the selection of local 
beneficiaries under a project managing sub-granting 
for MaC. 
The analysis of the selected EU programmes 
will be based on the operationalisation of the key 
issues identified in the literature review into the three 
indicators of status, agenda, and capacity. Indicators 
are then further disaggregated into a total of five sub-
indicators: status, support to organisations pursuing 
religious and political goals, proximity to EU values, 
previous experience on EU or international grants, and 
use of language.
First, EU programmes will be analysed with 
regard to the status (1) of the organisations they 
support. If EU programmes only fund officially 
registered organisations, this can greatly limit the 
representativeness of CS in countries where informal 
groups are central or where governments use 
registration to control and repress independent actors. 
Also, whether applicants can be for profit or non-profit, 
governmental or non-governmental organisations 
expands or restricts the reach of EU activities. 
Second, the analysis looks at the agenda of 
supported actors and identifies two sub-indicators 
that may define the boundaries of what CS does the 
EU support in the field of culture: explicit exclusion 
of organisations pursuing religious and political goals 
(2a) or support based on proximity to EU values (2b) 
on issues like gender, environment, minority or other 
horizontal issues. 
Third, the article enquires on the expected 
capacity of the organisations applying for EU 
funding and identifies two sub-indicators. Targeting 
organisations without previous experience on EU or 
international grants (3a) can contribute to create a 
path dependency and target an artificial CS isolated 
to the real local needs. Also, the use of language (3b) 
will be taken into account by checking whether EU 
programmes give access to actors who only speak local 
languages and do not master European languages like 
English or French. The research will rely on existing 
literature, official documents and websites from the 
EU and other organisations, as well as semi-structured 
interviews to managers of EU cultural programmes and 
projects.
International donors and support to 
civil society in developing countries: 
a literature review
 
Beginning in the late 1980s, the concept of CS stirred 
political aspirations in the international arena. As the 
Cold War was coming to an end with its winners and 
losers, CS raised in importance as a prerequisite to 
universalise Western liberal democracy as ”the final 
form of human government” (Fukuyama, 1989: 4). 
Inspired by Eastern Europe’s democracy movements 
of the 1980s, Western aid institutions added political 
objectives to their agendas, based on the idea 
that vibrant CS forces would play an active role in 
undermining authoritarian regimes and contributing to 
democratic consolidation. As such, the very expression 
‘civil society’ has evoked prospects of change and 
liberation: in Diamond’s view, for instance, it is “a vital 
instrument for containing the power of democratic 
governments, checking their potential abuses and 
violations of the law, and subjecting them to public 
scrutiny” (Diamond, 1994: 7). Against this background, in 
recent years a growing body of literature has nuanced 
celebratory assessments of CS and proposed a more 
careful look at the role and influence of international 
donors in developing countries.
As a first critical point, researchers have called into 
question conceptualisations of CS as the operational 
sphere of legally recognised organisations, as these 
provide only partial accounts of collective action 
in developing countries (Salamon & Anheier, 1997; 
Chazan, 1992; De Weijer & Kilnes, 2012; Benessaieh, 
2011; Lorch, 2016; Malena & Finn Heinrich, 2007; Kelley, 
2011). In other words, defining CS actors’ on the basis 
of their legal status could already entail a process of 
“PROFESSIONALIZATION APPEARS AS A KEY 
FEATURE OF THE CIVIL SOCIETY SECTOR, WHICH IN 
TURN RAISES QUESTIONS ABOUT ITS LEGITIMACY 
AND CAPACITY TO PROMOTE LONG-TERM 
CHANGE. SIMILAR CONCERNS ARE VOICED ON ENP 
SOUTHERN NEIGHBOURHOOD”
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inclusion or exclusion. For instance, Banks and Hulme 
criticise the “simplistic view of CS as a collection of 
organisations rather than a space for interaction and 
negotiation around power” (2012: 21). Also, Malena 
and Finn Heinrich (2007) note that such an approach 
focuses largely on Western contexts, in which formal 
or registered organisations are prevalent. Thus, it 
neglects those areas where most CSOs are informal or 
not registered. Similarly, De Weijer and Kilnes observe 
that the inclusion of non-recognised groups is crucial 
in fragile states, as “civil society tends to be much less 
organised and formalised than in other low-income 
or middle-income countries” (2012: 2). In addition, in 
some cases legal registration is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition to be an aid recipient: scholars have 
found that many international donors equate CS with 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and provide 
resources to support their sector, to the detriment of 
actors with a higher potential of social change, such 
as grassroots or social movements (Belloni, 2001; 
Seckinelgin, 2002; Banks & Hulme, 2012; De Weijer & 
Kilnes, 2012). Banks and Hulme point out that although 
NGOs are part of CS, “they are far from synonymous 
with CS, and do not automatically strengthen CS” (2012: 
21). 
Furthermore, literature has emphasised that 
donors’ exclusionary approach is not only ‘law-driven’, 
following the focus on the organisational status, but 
also "value-driven", as donors tend to predominantly 
target those forces sharing a Western agenda and also 
exclude actors with explicit political or religious goals 
(Tvedt, 1998, 2002; Clark, Friedman & Hochstetler, 
1998; Mercer, 2002; Clarke, 2006). In a case study on 
NGOs and international donors in Mexico, Benessaieh 
observes that, under donors’ influence, global 
CS tend to speak Northern tongues, showing “a 
discursive predominance of the norms and values of 
Western-liberal societies” (2011: 74). As a result, local 
organisations tend either to conform to the objectives 
of the donors and downplay their own agendas, or 
translate “both for donors and for communities in order 
to match the latter's perceived needs with the former's 
preferred language” (2011: 77). Similarly, Tvedt (1998, 
2002) notes that NGOs from developing countries 
have shown a worrying phenomenon of “institutional 
isomorphism” (2002: 370) in a short period of time. 
The aid industry thus operates as “a transmission belt 
of a dominant discourse tied to Western notions of 
development” (Ibid). However, isomorphism does not 
really apply to political or religious organisations: Clarke 
notes that donors face the challenge “of broadening 
their conception of civil society, of embracing its more 
politically contentious and culturally exotic aspects so 
that it becomes more socially inclusive” (2006: 846). 
Together with status and agenda, literature 
identifies capacity as another powerful indicator 
highlighting processes of inclusion or exclusion. Kelley 
(2011) observes that the techniques used by local 
NGOs hardly come from the grassroots of developing 
countries, as these organisations are often under the 
control of educated and western oriented individuals 
who, in spite of their weak CS connections, have higher 
capacity in managing international funding. Overall, 
professionalization appears as a key feature of the CS 
sector, which in turn raises questions about its legitimacy 
and capacity to promote long-term change. Similar 
concerns are voiced on ENP Southern neighbourhood: 
Cebeci and Schumacher raise the issue of co-
optation of CSOs, which are often professionalised, 
supported by local elites and “detached from their 
own populations, having little or no understanding of 
their local needs” (2017: 19). Together with previous 
experience in aid management, language barriers may 
also exclude grassroots organisations from applying. 
In a study assessing EU assistance to CS in the South 
Caucasus, Aliyev (2016) observes that lack of fluency 
in the English language can challenge grassroots 
organisations’ capacity to participate in European 
calls, as they are short of trained personnel or funds to 
request translation services. 
Contrary to those insisting that CS is by no means 
progressive and pursuing the public good (Diamond, 
1994 & 1997; Knight & Hartnell, 2001), some scholars 
have warned against exclusionary approaches. For 
instance, De Weijer and Kilnes (2012) stress that this 
may undermine participation, especially if they have a 
broad support in the public opinion and can bring social 
change. To Aliyev (2016), a major limit of EU support for 
CS in the South Caucasus lies in a substantial lack of 
representation of the civil actors the EU engages with. 
 While critical literature on international donors’ 
support to CS is extensive, EU’s actorness as a donor in 
developing countries, and particularly in ENP countries, 
has been so far largely neglected. Where possible, 
this section has attempted to include academic 
contributions on the subject (Belloni, 2001; Fischer, 2011; 
Aliyev, 2016; Schumacher, 2016; Cebeci & Schumacher, 
2017). In this regard, by assessing EU cultural discourse 
in the ENP, the next sections of this article attempt to 
fill a void in the literature and contribute to the broader 
debate over CS support.
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Tracing the boundaries of “civil 
society” in the ENP
Culture and cultural differences have a role in political 
and security discourses, dominating much of recent 
EU relations with the neighbourhood. ENP societies 
and cultures are often identified as ‘fragile’ and 
unprepared to absorb EU 
values (Cebeci & Schumacher, 
2017: 15-16). Some issues like 
terrorism and oppression of 
women can be presented as 
problems inherently related to 
Muslim culture, thus defining 
the boundaries of an imagined 
European identity. Pointing at 
cultural differences as a causal 
explanation for social, political 
and security issues often 
neglects the presence of similar 
phenomena in Europe (Ibid: 13), 
where gender inequality is far 
from being resolved, ethno-
nationalist terrorism has only 
recently been tamed (e.g. 
IRA, ETA), and extreme-wing 
political terrorism periodically 
resurfaces (e.g. 2011 Norway 
attacks). 
While culture can be 
used to reinforce geographical 
divisions, ENP discourses 
also recognise the presence 
of elements of proximity to EU values in partner 
countries. In fact, EU neighbours are not presented as 
homogeneous cultural and political entities. Rather, in 
EU narratives traits of "non-Europeanness" like political 
and religious radicalism, patriarchal rule and anti-liberal 
identities mostly belong to old autocratic political 
classes and generally to systems of powers that have 
lost touch with the more progressive masses. The ”civil 
society” in ENP countries is an ontologically good CS, 
trapped in political systems that restrain its quest for 
liberal transformation, which is a messianic realisation 
of the natural course of history. With these assumptions, 
the EU’s optimistic reaction and positive narratives vis-
à-vis revolutions in the Neighbourhood should not 
come as a surprise. In these discourses, the Arab Spring 
was initially perceived as the exclusive manifestation of 
the democratic uprising of the secularised youth rather 
than that of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist 
movements rising to power across the region, and a 
call for the EU “to support wholeheartedly the wish of 
the people in our neighbourhood to enjoy the same 
freedoms that we take as our right” (EC & HR, 2011a: 2). 
Similarly, Euromaidan protesters in Ukraine were only 
represented by the students brandishing EU flags, and 
EU statements made no relevant mention of the role 
of militants from Svoboda and 
Right Sector (see Ishchenko, 
2016). 
Arguably, CS in EU 
narratives is not synonymous 
with the best-representative 
sample of one country’s 
non-governmental forces, 
but rather a cherry-picked 
selection of those forces that 
uphold European values. The 
extent to which this cherry-
picking is also found in the 
practice of EU support to non-
governmental actors in the 
region is open to discussion, 
and is one of the elements 
addressed in this contribution. 
At the declaratory level, this is 
the picture that emerges from 
the key documents defining 
the ENP after the beginning of 
the Arab Spring. According to 
the 2011 Joint Communication 
A new response to a changing 
Neighbourhood, in the area 
“civil society plays a pivotal role in advancing women’s 
rights, greater social justice and respect for minorities 
as well as environmental protection and resource 
efficiency” and “empowers citizens to express their 
concerns, contribute to policymaking and hold 
governments to account” (EC & HR, 2011b: 4). But 
transformation towards liberal Western values is not 
just one among many paths that "civil society" might 
want to pursue, it is rather its natural course of action. 
When this willingness for change has not manifested 
itself yet, this is rather due to obstacles restraining 
this otherwise automatic evolution. Liberal change 
is already present at the heart of CS in neighbouring 
countries, but it might be sleeping or it might need the 
EU to act as a facilitator in a maieutic process where 
non-Western societies get to discover what they really 
want. For these reasons, “willingness to reform cannot 
be imposed from outside and the expectation for 
“CIVIL SOCIETY IN 
EU NARRATIVES IS 
NOT SYNONYMOUS 
WITH THE BEST-
REPRESENTATIVE 
SAMPLE OF ONE 
COUNTRY’S NON-
GOVERNMENTAL 
FORCES, BUT 
RATHER A CHERRY-
PICKED SELECTION 
OF THOSE FORCES 
THAT UPHOLD 
EUROPEAN 
VALUES”
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reform must come from within societies. EU policy can 
act as a catalyst in this process” (EC & HR, 2014: 8). The 
2015 ENP Review also promised stronger support to 
CS, inter alia as one of the tools to “uphold and promote 
universal values” (EC & HR, 2015: 5). This CS has a key 
role to play against government sector’s corruption 
and in holding state power accountable (ibid.: 6) in a 
Manichean dichotomy where non-governmental and 
private actors, including “civil society professionals” 
(ibid), seem to belong to an ideal community moved by 
liberal democratic values, as opposed to established 
powers holding their countries back. In sum, ‘civil 
society’ in EU discourse is arguably an abstraction, a 
projection of EU’s ideal Self into its neighbourhood. 
EU discourses and implicit definitions are not 
insulated from EU external action, and can potentially 
affect it in a variety of ways. From a social constructivist 
point of view (Rosamond, 2001; Risse & Maier, 2003; 
Checkel, 2004) discourse represents a source of power 
that establishes hierarchies and roles in society and 
defines identities. In more practical terms, ignoring 
or excluding social actors that do not fit EU’s ideal 
representation of CS can potentially affect the way 
the EU engages with ENP and other third countries. 
EU’s vision of CS based on a Western liberal bias can 
influence its role as an international actor supporting 
CSOs based on their status, agenda and capacity.
 
EU support to the cultural sector in 
the ENP: a case study
The following section analyses some multi-country 
programmes funding the cultural sector in the ENP 
East and South.
Culture in the ENP East
Instruments and programmes
To analyse EU cultural action in the Eastern 
neighbourhood, this case study looks at cross-border 
cooperation (CBC) programmes in 2014-2020. CBC 
has been chosen over two other cultural initiatives: the 
EaP Culture and Creativity Programme and Creative 
Europe. The former, which ended in early 2018 and was 
designed to enhance cultural action in EaP countries, 
did not provide sub-granting to local organisations 
(Interview 4) and thus falls out of the scope of the 
article. As for Creative Europe, while Georgia, Moldova, 
and Ukraine joined it in the past years, it remains a 
programme targeting mainly EU member states (MS) 
cultural sectors.
Under the European Neighbourhood Instrument, 
CBC aims at enhancing cooperation between EU MS 
and those neighbours sharing land or sea borders. 
Similarly to the European Territorial Cooperation 
programmes, CBC initiatives do not target MS or 
neighbouring countries but rather those Eligible 
Territorial Units (ETUs) along shared land borders and 
sea basins. Under Thematic Objective 3 (TO3), CBC 
aims explicitly at the promotion of local culture and the 
preservation of historical heritage.
Out of the seventeen CBC programmes 
included in the Programming Document 2014-2020, 
seven targeted Eastern neighbourhood countries. Two 
additional criteria were adopted in this case study. 
First, the publication of relevant call of proposals for 
the period 2014-2020, in order to analyse their Terms 
of References and annexed documents. Second, the 
possibility for Eastern neighbourhood partners to 
receive funds under the programme as main applicants. 
Based on this selection, which further excluded two 
programmes, this case study reviews four land-border 
and one sea basin programmes. Programmes are 
listed in table 1.
Most of the selected programmes funded 
cultural projects under TO3. As an exception, Black 
Sea Basin (BSB) stakeholders defined TO1 and TO6, 
focusing respectively on business and environment 
protection, as primary objectives of the programme. 
However, as consultations highlighted the need to 
reflect some cultural aspects under economic issues, 
it was recommended priority 1.1 of the programme to 
promote “business and entrepreneurship in the tourism 
and cultural sectors” (MDRAP, 2015c).
Furthermore, Joint Operational Programmes 
(JOPs) provided in some cases relevant analyses on 
culture and CS. For instance, within BSB, the document 
identified some weaknesses in local organisations’ 
limited networking and poor anchoring in society. 
Perhaps most importantly, while informal involvement 
was positively valued, stronger professionalisation was 
a goal to reach.
Similar aspects were highlighted in other 
programmes. In the SWOT Analysis of RO-MD JOP 
(MDRAP 2015a), the two major weaknesses identified 
in Moldova were weak expertise and co-financing 
capacities. In more general terms, other JOPs stressed 
the untapped potential of cultural and historical 
heritage (LLB and PBU) and the role that communities 
could play to preserve local identities (PBU and RO-
MD). In particular, under RO-MD and RO-UA, and 
contrary to the other programmes, religious/cult 
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institutions were mentioned as possible beneficiaries 
of actions, suggesting that religious heritage was 
somewhat part of the broader objective of preservation 
and valorisation of local culture and identity. 
Financial support to cultural actors
To analyse the funding mechanisms supporting cultural 
actors in CBC, this section reviews publicly available 
documents under the ‘Call for Proposals’ sections, with 
a focus on the documents ‘Guidelines for Applicants’, 
explaining the requirements of the programmes, and 
the Evaluation Grids, providing a framework for the 
assessment of proposals. Table 2 lists the seven Calls 
for Proposals reviewed. 
Status 
Generally speaking, all guidelines indicated that calls 
for proposals were open to regional, local or national 
public authorities, bodies governed by public law, and 
non-profit organisations, which include a wide range 
of CS forces. Also, annexes often provided examples 
of eligible organisations. With the notable exception 
Programme
Programme
Black Sea Basin (BSB)
Poland-Belarus-Ukraine 
(PBU)
Romania-Republic of Moldo-
va (RO-MD)
BSB
LLB
PBU
RO-UA
LLB
PBU
RO-MD
Latvia-Lithuania-Belarus 
(LLB)
Romania-Ukraine (RO-UA)
(LLB)
Ukraine: Odessa, Mykolaiv, 
Kherson, Sevastopol, 
Zaporosh’ye and Donetsk
Oblasts, Crimea Republic, 
Sevastopol
Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan: the whole 
country
Belarus: Hrodna and Brest 
oblasts
Ukraine: Volynska, Lvivska 
and Zakarpatska Oblasts
Moldova: the whole country
1st Call for Proposals (2017)
2nd Call for Proposals (2017)
2nd Call for Proposals (2018)
1st Call for Proposals (Soft Projects, 2018) 
1st Call for Proposals (2016)
1st Call for Proposals (2016)
1st Call for Proposals (Soft projects, 2018)
Belarus: Hrodna and Vitebsk 
Oblasts
Ukraine: Ivano-Frankivsk, 
Zakarpatska, Chernivtsi, 
Odesska Oblasts
49,038,597.00
183,078,184.00
81,000,000.00
500,000.00
100,000.00
20,000.00
50,000.00
100,000.00
100,000.00
50,000.00
74,000,000.00
60,000,000.00
TO1 with cultural dimension 
‘Jointly promote business 
and entrepreneurship in the 
tourism and cultural sectors’: 
25,337,752.68.
TO3: 32,272,159.47
TO3: 22,024,402.00
1,500,000.00
1,200,000.00
60,000.00
1,000,000.00
1,500,000.00
2,500,000.00
100,000.00
TO3: 17,600,000.00 
TO3: 6,000,000.00
ETUs in Neighbouring 
countries
Call for Proposals analysed
Total Budget in EUR
Minimum amount
Budget on culture
Maximum amount
TABLE 1. CBC PROGRAMMES ANALYSED IN THIS STUDY
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.
TABLE 2. CALLS FOR PROPOSALS ANALYSED IN THE FIVE PROGRAMMES AND GRANT RANGE
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.
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of LLB calls, in which bodies having partly industrial 
or commercial character could apply as partners of 
the projects, profit-making entities were not eligible. 
Overall, the legal status of the organisation was a 
necessary pre-requisite to apply for funding. Informal 
groups were therefore excluded from participating 
in the programs, as guidelines did not provide the 
possibility to ‘formalise informal groups’ or to partner 
with a formal applicant.
Agenda
Rules on eligibility gave some indications on potential 
exclusionary approaches related to the agenda of the 
organisations. As a first finding, guidelines seemed to 
provide little space for political groups. For instance, 
BSB included political parties as non-eligible actors, 
while other programs stressed that activities of a 
political or ideological nature were not funded. As an 
exception, PBU calls did not state any limitation but 
specified that those actions violating EU horizontal 
policy rules were not eligible.
When it comes to religious organisations, 
findings were more nuanced. On the one hand, in BSB 
organisations representing religious cults were clearly 
not eligible, while PBU Guidelines of the 1st call for 
Proposals specified that religious actions or activities 
were not funded. On the other hand, in RO-MD and RO-
UA religious/cult institutions were listed as possible 
(co-)applicants. This also applied to PBU 2nd call, which 
included parishes as eligible for funding. 
Finally, in four out of five programmes (PBU being 
the exception), evaluation grids marked the presence 
of one or more cross-cutting themes (environmental 
sustainability, gender equality, democracy and 
human rights). As an example, RO-MD evaluation grid 
assessed “positive influence on more than one cross 
cutting theme of the Programme, project’s contribution 
during project lifetime and/or ex-post” (RO-MD, no 
date). Cross-cutting themes were marked out of five in 
the four programmes, although it should be specified 
that evaluation grids had different maximum scores 
(ranging from 95 within LLB to 125 in RO-MD and RO-
UA).
Capacity 
When it comes to the capacity requested by the 
Programmes, evaluation grids provided interesting 
insights. Three overall criteria were marked in all grids: 
previous experience on project management, proven 
financial capacity, and appropriate staff resources to 
run the projects. Previous implementation of EU or other 
international projects was requested in all programmes, 
with the exception of PBU. Also, the grading scheme 
was stricter on the two bilateral programmes involving 
Romania on the one hand, and Ukraine/Moldova 
on the other hand. To get 2 points in the evaluation 
assessment, more than 50% of the project Partners 
should have already “participated in or managed at 
least 2 EU / other internationally funded projects” 
(RO-MD & RO-UA no date), while the applicant should 
have managed at least one EU or other international 
project. However, a 0 point evaluation did not prevent 
in principle an organisation from getting the grant.
Of course, any assessment on capacity should 
be carefully contrasted with the grant range of the 
calls, which are provided in table 2. On the one hand, 
it is undeniable that strict management and financial 
requirements were somewhat inevitable for larger 
projects. This is especially the case of the BSB, in which 
the minimum grant was 500,000 euros. However, 
these same rules also applied to smaller projects of 
other programs, and in particular to the PBU 2nd call 
and RO-MD, which funded relatively small cultural 
actions (see table 2). Overall, programmes did not 
look at the broader regional cultural sector, including 
both experienced and less experienced organisations. 
Rather, they tended to privilege the former for sub-
granting and to exclude the latter not on the ground 
of eligibility rules, but rather of requested capabilities.
Last but not least, languages rules can assess 
the presence of exclusionary approaches. On this note, 
all the five analysed programmes did not reflect a 
concern of inclusion, as English was the only language 
that organisations could use to submit proposals. 
This applied even to RO-MD calls, in spite of the fact 
that participating countries shared the same official 
language. As an exception, in the case of LLB the 
call for proposals and video explanations were in 
four languages, while in some other cases technical 
documents (i.e. energetic audits) could be provided in 
local languages (i.e. Romanian for RO-MD calls).
 
Culture in the ENP South
Instruments and programmes
The following case study on the ENP South concerns 
the main post-Arab spring regional programme in 
the field of culture, MaC (2014-2017, 17 million euros), 
supporting media and culture for democratisation, 
development and stronger Euro-Mediterranean 
intercultural relations. MaC budget financed two 
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service contracts and one call for proposals to launch 
operational programmes and projects. The two service 
contracts established sub-programmes for cultural 
policy reform (Med Culture – 3 million euros) and 
capacity development of the media sector (MedMedia 
– 5 million euros). The remaining 9 million euros were 
assigned through a call for proposals for capacity 
building of cultural operators and enhancement of 
freedom of expression in the media sector (EC, 2017). 
Two projects specifically focused on culture were 
funded under this call for proposals, and successively 
managed sub-granting towards local CSOs: SouthMed 
CV1 (2 million euros) and "Drama, Diversity and 
Development"2 (DDD) (1.9 million euros). 
In establishing MaC, attention was dedicated 
to the need to reach the cultural sector in an as large 
and representative way as possible, although no 
explicit mention was made of the risk of only targeting 
a minority of Western-minded and better-technically 
and financially endowed formal organisations (see 
EC, 2017). In the framework of the programme, the EC 
underlined its commitment to the promotion of cultural 
diversity (ibid.: 6), and the need to expand its reach to 
rural and remote areas, both to train cultural operators 
and to enlarge audiences for cultural activities. At the 
same time, a need to internationalise and globalise the 
capacity of local cultural operators was stated (Ibid: 
7-9), which signals that target groups besides already 
‘Westernised’ actors, were deemed important. A certain 
awareness of the non-European nature of the cultural 
sector in the ENP South was also demonstrated, by 
listing as potential risks the low absorption capacity of 
funds (high) and the fact that cultural operators might 
prefer support from Gulf Countries (moderate to high) 
(Ibid: 10). Most importantly, the EC put emphasis on 
community outreach and inclusion as well as cross-
cultural contacts. Target groups for the programme 
included religious and national minorities, while 
religious organisations constituted more generic 
"stakeholders" (Ibid.: 10-11).
In terms of contacts with non-secular and non-
Westernised actors, there was not a primary focus 
on including Islamic CS, but contacts are generally 
not hindered by EU instruments themselves. On the 
demand side, religious themes were hardly found 
in the discourse (e.g. in project proposals) of mostly 
independent and secular cultural organisations seeking 
for international funding (Interviews 1, 2, 3). Also, it is 
very rare that religious or political organizations try to 
apply for EU funding in culture (Ibid.), and exchanges 
mostly happen at the policy level. For example, 
EU programmes have aimed to create trialogues, 
bringing together the independent cultural sector 
with governments and institutional actors, which 
are often more conservative and have closer ties to 
Islam. A region-wide reflection on how to bridge the 
independent cultural sector with the "Central Islamic 
discourse" started with the 2010 first Conference on 
Cultural Policies in the Arab World, organised by the 
Al Mawred al Thaqafy with the European Cultural 
Foundation, and including several European actors. At 
the EU level, dialogues are facilitated both in bilateral 
and regional fora. An example comes from Med Culture. 
The programme accompanied Jordan towards the 
drafting of a national strategy for culture, serving as a 
facilitator and mediator between government services 
and cultural stakeholders. Independent cultural actors 
were mostly reached by the programme, and the 
government brought to the table more conservative 
cultural actors running state programmes. When 
debating over the inclusion of a definition of ”Jordanian 
culture” in the strategy, "institutional" cultural actors 
insisted to explicitly mention Islam, which independent 
cultural stakeholders and Med Culture mostly opposed. 
After animated discussion, the solution was found in 
acknowledging that this religious reference is already 
“IN TERMS OF CONTACTS WITH NON-SECULAR 
AND NON-WESTERNISED ACTORS, THERE 
WAS NOT A PRIMARY FOCUS ON INCLUDING 
ISLAMIC CIVIL SOCIETY, BUT CONTACTS ARE 
GENERALLY NOT HINDERED BY EU INSTRUMENTS 
THEMSELVES”
1 SouthMed CV aimed to “bring culture from the margins to the centre of the public sphere in the Southern Mediterranean, exploring its 
potential connections with economic, social and political development strategies” (SouthMed CV, 2018). 
2 DDD aimed to use culture “to promote diversity and challenge discrimination against minorities” (Med Culture, 2018). 
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present in the Jordanian constitution and therefore 
there was no need to restate it in the document 
(Interview 2). 
The design and implementation of Med Culture 
and the two sub-granting projects also showed a 
certain attention to avoiding Euro-centric approaches 
by reaching local operators. Med Culture, SouthMed 
CV and DDD have websites in Arabic, French and 
English and have been managed by teams including 
mostly Arabic-speaking professionals, predominantly 
originating from Southern Mediterranean countries 
(See Med Culture 2018; DDD 2018; SouthMed CV 2018). 
Running these instruments in Arabic was fundamental 
in terms of outreach, allowing non-French and non-
English speaking cultural actors to benefit from their 
activities and funding (Interviews 1, 2, 3). 
Financial support to cultural actors
The analysis of the funding mechanisms put in place to 
support cultural actors also reflects a certain concern 
for inclusion, with some limitations. Table 3 takes into 
consideration some requirements and guidelines for 
applicants for DDD and SouthMed CV main calls for 
projects, based on the three indicators proposed in the 
methodology. 
Status
In terms of status, requirements to be a registered 
organisation and absence of government constraints 
to receive foreign funding limit the reach of EU projects 
but are difficult to sidestep. However, to enhance 
inclusiveness and representativeness SouthMed 
Legal personality
Not eligible
Not eligible
Eligible
Reference to EU values
Geographical
provenience
YES
Individual artists. Organisations non eligible to 
legally receive funding from abroad without 
constraint or requiring the permission of a 
Ministry or Government body for each grant.
Registered arts or minority rights organisations. 
Lead applicant must be non-profit. If partners 
are for profit organisations, still no profit can be 
made from the project. Applicants embedded 
in or have excellent links with and the trust of 
the respective ethnic, religious or linguistic 
minority community.
Only projects that challenge discrimination 
against minorities (e.g. land, identity, 
discrimination in the job market, physical 
attacks and hate speech, hate crime). Gender 
factoring is an evaluation criteria.
Organisations based and established (as 
demonstrated in the organisation’s statutes) in 
ENP South programme countries. Even when 
part of a consortium. 
YES (main applicant)
Events of religious or political character.
Main applicants must be non-profit 
organisations. The participation of non-
registered organisations as partners, with 
the exclusion of the main applicant, may be 
accepted in duly justified cases and insofar 
their existence can be proven (e.g. cultural and 
artistic groups or platforms of professionals 
having carried out activities).
Awareness-raising activities on issues such as 
cultural diversity, social inclusion, gender or 
environmental issues, among others. 
Organisations legally registered in the eligible 
countries, and active in the cultural sector in 
the Southern Mediterranean region. 
DDD'
Status
Agenda
SouthMed CV**
Aspects fostering
inclusiveness
Selection criterion: strong links with minority 
organisations and communities.
For projects focusing on contributing to 
strengthening the role of culture at local, 
national and regional level, in cooperation with 
other stakeholders in the public sphere (e.g. 
organisations active in the social, educational 
or environmental fields, youth and cultural 
centres, schools, universities, libraries, local 
authorities, etc.).
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(Co-)applicants’ 
experience and 
professionalization
Language of the
proposal
Strong emphasis on experience. Substantial 
experience of running relevant and similarly 
complex arts projects. Good project 
management skills including the ability to raise 
required match funding.
French, Arabic or English.
Medium emphasis on experience. Previous 
experience and quality of the team evaluated, 
accounting for 25% of evaluation criteria (30% 
second call). Links with international and 
Euro-Mediterranean networks considered as a 
positive factor insofar the added value of this 
type of networking is clearly established.
English or Arabic. Second call: translation in 
English or French needed if submission in 
Arabic). 
DDD'
Capacity
SouthMed CV**
* This table only refers to the main grant activity of the project: two calls issued in 2014 and 2015. These were 
complemented by smaller calls. One for a film, open to individuals. The other for small grants for advocacy activities.
** This table refers to the two calls issued in 2015 and 2016.
TABLE 3: RELEVANT ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS AND APPLICATION GUIDELINES UNDER 
DDD AND SOUTHMED CV
Source: DDD3 and SouthMed CV4. 
3 So  Various documents related to grants activities: Calls for proposals, guidelines and evaluation criteria of Street Theatre, Film and 
Advocacy grants; List of selected, rejected and non-eligible applicants and projects accompanied by selection committee’s comments on 
each application. Documents requested by the authors and retrieved by e-mail on April 30th,2018.
4 Various documents related to grants activities: Calls for proposals, guidelines and evaluation criteria of the two rounds of calls held by the 
project; List of selected, rejected and non-eligible applicants and projects. Documents requested by the authors and retrieved by e-mail on 
May 10th, 2018.
CV also opened to non-registered partners under 
some conditions. Strict principles of geographical 
provenience prevented organisations not rooted 
in the local context (e.g. European organisations) 
from competing for support. DDD and SouthMed CV 
predominantly worked with non-for profit organisations, 
even when this meant coaching local organisations to 
find co-funding opportunities (Interview 1, 3). 
Agenda
Events of religious or political character were 
specifically non-eligible for funding under SouthMed 
CV. In fact, the project aimed at inclusion irrespective 
of religious credo and did not target specific religious 
groups (Interview 1). In the case of DDD, inclusiveness 
was mostly a matter of including minorities, be they 
religious (e.g. Christians), ethnic (e.g. Berber, Touareg, 
Black Africans etc.), linguistic (e.g. Tamazight speakers) 
or other fragile ones (refugees, migrants) – rather than 
getting in touch with non-secular and non-Westernised 
cultural actors per se (Interview 3). Also, exclusion of 
certain actors with political or religious affiliations that 
could be considered as part of broader CS, mostly did 
not depend on eligibility rules but on the nature of the 
target sector itself. On the one hand, the artistic sector 
is naturally more independent from political powers, 
and mostly refuses to sing government-led tunes. On 
the other hand, although practice varies greatly, many 
forms of artistic expression are limited or prohibited 
under a strict interpretation of Islamic law  and therefore 
the cultural and artistic sector is mostly detached from 
religious forces. In fact, it is very rare to find references 
to religious or politically sensitive factors in applications 
to programme initiatives (Interview 2). Therefore, the 
exclusion of religious and political actors in calls for 
proposals is rather a priori (Interview 3). 
With reference to EU values, these are 
embedded in sub-granting projects, but the selection 
process itself was not focused on the presence of 
pro-EU language or EU cultural symbols, and rather 
prioritised local empowerment and capacity building 
(Interview 1).
Capacity
With reference to path dependency in funding, a 
small circle of internationally-funded organisations, 
experience and economic and administrative capacity 
to write and manage European projects were clearly 
valued. However, EU funding in culture has had a strong 
formal and informal capacity building dimension. For 
example, DDD aimed to target ‘young’ associations 
that had thus far only managed small grants, to give 
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them the possibility to manage a bigger project for the 
first time. Also, DDD grants for street theatre activities 
required a 25% match funding from the applicants, who 
were however helped by DDD itself to find co-funders 
(Interview 3). The same support for co-funding was 
operated by SouthMed CV (Interview 1).
In terms of language requirements, calls 
for proposals and participation to the activities 
predominantly accepted applications in Arabic, which 
was perceived to be a key factor to reach social groups 
representative of the local cultural sector (Interviews 1, 
2, 3). However, at times organisations applying in Arabic 
were still required to be able to work in English and 
French for following activities. This should not be seen 
as a pure Northern cultural predominance but rather 
as a necessary measure to ensure communication 
between Southern participants themselves, who may 
otherwise speak very different national dialects of 
Arabic, or Hebrew, or other regional languages and 
thus be unable to work together effectively without 
resorting to colonial ones (Interview 2).
Selection of applicants: a case study
To corroborate the findings of this article, the current 
section provides a case study based on the two main 
calls for proposals issued by DDD for street theatre 
projects. The choice is due to the availability of detailed 
data concerning the selection process, including marks 
assigned to projects and applicants’ profiles based on 
the selection criteria and qualitative comments on each 
application by the reviewers (DDD, no date). Only some 
of the selection criteria used for each call are relevant 
to assess the inclusiveness of EU’s support towards 
local society, namely in call 1 (see table 4).
The second call for proposals evaluated projects 
based on 5 criteria. Criteria 2, 3 and 4 remained the 
same as above, but here they had to be assigned up 
to 20/100 points each. Altogether, the example of 
DDD can provide a representative overview of how the 
indicators identified in this article can be found in EU 
support to cultural operators in the Neighbourhood. 
First, status proved to be important for the 
selection of potential candidates, although it did 
not top the list. Exclusion of projects on the basis of 
little links between the applicants and the relevant 
minorities or their capacity to reach certain areas 
were often mentioned as reasons for rejection in both 
calls. However, criterion 2 seemed to come after other 
considerations (e.g. strength and relevance of the 
project concerning DDD’s objectives of challenging 
racism and discrimination experienced by a minority 
community). In fact, criterion 2 appeared to be slightly 
less central than others in call 1, and only ranked 6th/10 
in terms of average weight on the final mark (9.78% of 
final project marks on average). Similar relevance was 
given to the same criterion in call 2, where it ranked 
3rd/5, weighting 20.15%.
In terms of agenda, religious and political aspects 
did not figure as reasons for the exclusion of applicants, 
apart from when targeting very sensitive areas in the 
Israeli-Palestinian case or when supporting a minority 
religious group without putting it in dialogue with the 
broader society. As stated, little to no applications to EU 
programmes in culture come from religious or political 
organisations, for different reasons. Among selected 
projects in call 1, the criterion that most contributed to 
the final mark assigned by the reviewers was number 
3 (10.96%), which signals the importance to select 
projects addressing relevant minority issues. The same 
Indicator Criterion
Status
Capacity
Criterion 2 – Strong and credible links between the applicant(s) and minority organisations and 
minority communities to be featured in the drama. (up to 10/100 points)
Agenda Criterion 3 – Does the featured minority community suffer serious discrimination and 
disadvantage? How relevant is the project to their situation? I.e. how likely is a street theatre 
project to influence or change negative attitudes and discriminatory behaviour against them? (up 
to 10/100 points)
Criterion 4 – Track record and current capacity of the applicant(s) in successfully managing 
projects of a similar complexity, involving similar issues and of a similar size. (up to 10/100 points)
Criterion 9 – How well has gender been factored into the programme? (up to 10/100 points)
Criterion 5 – Ability of the applicant(s) to raise match funding within a reasonable time frame. (up 
to 10/100 points)
TABLE 4. SELECTION CRITERIA USED TO ASSESS THE INCLUSIVENESS OF EU’S SUPPORT
Source: Author’s own elaboration.
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criterion ranked 1st/5 in call 2 (21.79%). Finally, criterion 
9, based on how gender had been factored into the 
projects, did not appear to be the most central in the 
selection process, ranking 7th/10 place in call 1 (9.42%).
Capacity of the applicants with respect to previous 
management of EU or other international projects was 
very central in the selection process, which could at 
first suggest a risk for path dependency in funding 
organisations that are already part of a small western-
minded circle of actors, not entirely representative of 
local CS. In call 1, reviewers’ comments put a strong 
emphasis on the capacity and previous experience in the 
management of similar projects, particularly funded by 
international donors or organisations in DDD’s network. 
In the same call, the 2nd and 3rd most relevant criteria 
out of ten where number 4 (10,85%) and 5 (10,81%). 
Similarly, criterion 4 came 2nd/5 in call 2 (20,82%) where, 
however, reviewers rarely mentioned it as a factor 
for rejection. Most importantly, a strong dimension of 
capacity building towards associations which had only 
managed smaller grants, as well as a predominant 
focus on their track record in managing projects that 
were relevant to DDD activities (rather than simply large 
and foreign-funded), were emphasised in both the 
comments accompanying the selection process and in 
Interview 3. Also, there did not seem to be a selection 
bias in terms of language: despite small changes which 
could be due to other factors, applications in Arabic 
had similar chances to be approved compared to those 
in English and French. For the first call of DDD street 
theatre, 33 projects out of 65 valid applications were 
selected. More than one third of the projects (25/65) 
were presented in Arabic, and this percentage was also 
roughly reflected among the selected projects (11/33). 
For call 2, 53 out of 82 applications were selected for 
funding. Applications in Arabic amounted to 38 out of 
82 valid and 23 out of 53 of those selected.
Conclusions
This article sought to assess whether the boundaries of 
what the cultural sector means for the EU are mostly 
based on a Eurocentric understanding of CS or rather 
on a more inclusive definition mediated with the nature 
of societies in partner countries. It started from the 
hypothesis that the EU supports ENP CS in the field 
of culture on the basis of its closeness to European 
standards, norms and values. The findings of the article 
highlight a mixed picture. 
On the one hand, a Eurocentric understanding 
of CS prevails in EU discourses and is enforced upon 
CSOs by technical means. When it comes to the 
status of the organisations, in both Southern and 
Eastern neighbourhoods the legal status appeared to 
be a fundamental pre-requisite to apply, although in 
SouthMed CV non-formal groups could also participate 
and geographical requirements on status were used to 
ensure the genuinely local nature of applicants. Strict 
requirements on the capacities are in line with this 
approach. Previous experience in project management, 
and in particular EU or international projects, together 
with the presence of appropriate staff resources, were 
central in the selection process. As such, exclusion of 
less experienced and professionalised organisations on 
this ground could suggest a risk for path dependency, as 
the EU would fund in the long term only those western-
minded groups of actors that do not represent the 
broader ENP CS. However, EU instruments are in some 
cases characterised by a strong dimension of capacity 
building towards less experienced associations, on the 
condition that their activities are strongly relevant to 
their focus and objectives. When it comes to the sub-
indicator of language, contrasting results were found 
in the two regions. While in ENP East English was the 
only language that organisations could use to submit 
proposals, in the South, applications in Arabic were 
accepted in order to enhance inclusiveness and no 
language bias could be found.
On the other hand, the EU does not seem to 
impose strong requirements concerning the agenda of 
organisations and aims to be as inclusive as possible. 
While little space is provided to groups with political 
affiliation, this finding is more nuanced for religious 
groups as in some cases organisations, parishes, and 
other cult institutions are encouraged to apply for 
funding. Also, a structural factor should be taken into 
account, especially in the Southern neighbourhood: 
that is, the distance between the cultural sector and 
political or religious forces, with the former refusing to 
sing government-led tunes and the latter tending to limit 
heavily artistic expressions. This was also confirmed by 
a substantial absence of religious or politically sensitive 
references in applications to the programmes analysed.
In a comparative dimension of the two areas of the 
Neighbourhood, it appears that a concern of inclusion 
guided the EU especially in the South, as there was an 
attempt to (1) reach the cultural sector in an as large and 
representative way as possible and (2) provide more 
space to less formalised and skilled organisations. 
On the contrary, path dependency appeared to be 
more pronounced in the East, as calls for proposals 
did not include a dimension of capacity building, 
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neither open up opportunities to formalise informal 
groups. While it is impossible to infer from this case 
study an EU’s overarching political strategy, a general 
EU approach to the role of CS in the Neighbourhood 
emerges from the broader analysis and cited literature: 
by projecting its understanding of CS as a force for 
liberal political change onto different socio-political 
contexts, the EU supports selected CSOs with the goal 
to support transformation towards more democratic 
and peaceful societies. The case study on the cultural 
sector presented here confirms this approach, while 
mitigating it with the finding of a clear effort made by 
the EU to reach organisations that genuinely represent 
local needs.
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